Architecture

System Architecture

The device attestation system consists of three main components:

┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    Client Device                       │
│  ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │           rest_client.py                         │  │
│  │  - Request nonce                                 │  │
│  │  - Invoke imx-smw-app                            │  │
│  │  - Submit attestation data                       │  │
│  └──────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘  │
│                 │                                      │
│  ┌──────────────▼───────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │           imx-smw-app                            │  │
│  │  - Device management operations                  │  │
│  │  - Key management operations                     │  │
│  │  - Interface to SMW                              │  │
│  └──────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘  │
│                 │                                      │
│  ┌──────────────▼───────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │    Security Middleware (SMW)                     │  │
│  │  - Abstraction layer for security operations     │  │
│  └──────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘  │
│                 │                                      │
│  ┌──────────────▼───────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │      EdgeLock Enclave (ELE)                      │  │
│  │  - Secure key storage                            │  │
│  │  - Cryptographic operations                      │  │
│  │  - Attestation signature generation              │  │
│  └──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘  │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                          │
                          │ HTTPS/REST
                          │
┌─────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────┐
│                 Attestation Server                    │
│  ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│  │           rest_server.py                         │ │
│  │  - Generate nonces                               │ │
│  │  - Retrieve certificates (EL2GO)                 │ │
│  │  - Verify attestation data                       │ │
│  │  - Validate certificate chains                   │ │
│  └──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                          │
                          │ HTTPS API
                          │
┌─────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────┐
│            EdgeLock 2GO Cloud Service                 │
│  - Certificate provisioning                           │
│  - Device certificate storage                         │
│  - Certificate chain management                       │
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Component Details

Client Components

rest_client.py

Python script running on the i.MX device that:

  • Communicates with the attestation server via REST API

  • Invokes imx-smw-app for cryptographic operations

  • Handles three main operations:

    • nonce: Request fresh nonce from server

    • attest_el2go: Perform attestation with EL2GO integration

    • attest_pubkey: Perform attestation with public key

imx-smw-app

Command-line application that interfaces with SMW:

  • dev-mgmt -u: Get device UUID

  • dev-mgmt -a: Generate attestation data

  • key-mgmt -a: Export attestation public key

Server Components

rest_server.py

FastAPI-based server that:

  • Provides REST endpoints for attestation

  • Generates cryptographic nonces

  • Retrieves certificates from EdgeLock 2GO

  • Verifies attestation signatures

  • Validates certificate chains using OpenSSL

Certificate Hierarchy (EdgeLock 2GO method)

The attestation uses a three-level certificate chain:

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│  NXP TP Attestation Root CA Certificate         │
│  (Root of Trust)                                │
└──────────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘
                   │
                   │ Signs
                   │
┌──────────────────▼──────────────────────────────┐
│  NXP 12NC Attestation CA Certificate            │
│  (Product-specific Intermediate CA)             │
└──────────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘
                   │
                   │ Signs
                   │
┌──────────────────▼──────────────────────────────┐
│  NXP DIE Attestation Authentication Cert        │
│  (Device-specific Leaf Certificate)             │
│  - Unique per device                            │
│  - Contains device public key                   │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

Data Flow

Attestation Data Structure

The attestation data generated by ELE contains:

  • Signature: Cryptographic signature over the nonce

  • Device Information: UUID or public key

  • Metadata: Additional device-specific information

All data is transmitted as hexadecimal strings via JSON payloads.

Network Communication

REST API Endpoints:

  • GET /get_nonce: Request fresh nonce

  • POST /attest_el2go: Submit attestation with UUID

  • POST /attest_pubkey: Submit attestation with public key

Security Considerations

Nonce Management

  • Nonces are cryptographically random

  • Single-use to prevent replay attacks

  • Server validates nonce freshness

Key Protection

  • Private keys never leave ELE

  • All signing operations performed in secure enclave

  • Public keys can be safely exported

Certificate Validation

  • Full chain validation from root CA

  • Proper OpenSSL verification flags used