Architecture
System Architecture
The device attestation system consists of three main components:
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Client Device │
│ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ rest_client.py │ │
│ │ - Request nonce │ │
│ │ - Invoke imx-smw-app │ │
│ │ - Submit attestation data │ │
│ └──────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌──────────────▼───────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ imx-smw-app │ │
│ │ - Device management operations │ │
│ │ - Key management operations │ │
│ │ - Interface to SMW │ │
│ └──────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌──────────────▼───────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ Security Middleware (SMW) │ │
│ │ - Abstraction layer for security operations │ │
│ └──────────────┬───────────────────────────────────┘ │
│ │ │
│ ┌──────────────▼───────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ EdgeLock Enclave (ELE) │ │
│ │ - Secure key storage │ │
│ │ - Cryptographic operations │ │
│ │ - Attestation signature generation │ │
│ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
└────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
│ HTTPS/REST
│
┌─────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────┐
│ Attestation Server │
│ ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │
│ │ rest_server.py │ │
│ │ - Generate nonces │ │
│ │ - Retrieve certificates (EL2GO) │ │
│ │ - Verify attestation data │ │
│ │ - Validate certificate chains │ │
│ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘ │
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
│
│ HTTPS API
│
┌─────────────────────────▼─────────────────────────────┐
│ EdgeLock 2GO Cloud Service │
│ - Certificate provisioning │
│ - Device certificate storage │
│ - Certificate chain management │
└───────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Component Details
Client Components
rest_client.py
Python script running on the i.MX device that:
Communicates with the attestation server via REST API
Invokes
imx-smw-appfor cryptographic operationsHandles three main operations:
nonce: Request fresh nonce from serverattest_el2go: Perform attestation with EL2GO integrationattest_pubkey: Perform attestation with public key
imx-smw-app
Command-line application that interfaces with SMW:
dev-mgmt -u: Get device UUIDdev-mgmt -a: Generate attestation datakey-mgmt -a: Export attestation public key
Server Components
rest_server.py
FastAPI-based server that:
Provides REST endpoints for attestation
Generates cryptographic nonces
Retrieves certificates from EdgeLock 2GO
Verifies attestation signatures
Validates certificate chains using OpenSSL
Certificate Hierarchy (EdgeLock 2GO method)
The attestation uses a three-level certificate chain:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ NXP TP Attestation Root CA Certificate │
│ (Root of Trust) │
└──────────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘
│
│ Signs
│
┌──────────────────▼──────────────────────────────┐
│ NXP 12NC Attestation CA Certificate │
│ (Product-specific Intermediate CA) │
└──────────────────┬──────────────────────────────┘
│
│ Signs
│
┌──────────────────▼──────────────────────────────┐
│ NXP DIE Attestation Authentication Cert │
│ (Device-specific Leaf Certificate) │
│ - Unique per device │
│ - Contains device public key │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Data Flow
Attestation Data Structure
The attestation data generated by ELE contains:
Signature: Cryptographic signature over the nonce
Device Information: UUID or public key
Metadata: Additional device-specific information
All data is transmitted as hexadecimal strings via JSON payloads.
Network Communication
REST API Endpoints:
GET /get_nonce: Request fresh noncePOST /attest_el2go: Submit attestation with UUIDPOST /attest_pubkey: Submit attestation with public key
Security Considerations
Nonce Management
Nonces are cryptographically random
Single-use to prevent replay attacks
Server validates nonce freshness
Key Protection
Private keys never leave ELE
All signing operations performed in secure enclave
Public keys can be safely exported
Certificate Validation
Full chain validation from root CA
Proper OpenSSL verification flags used